PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS
FROM MARCOS TO ARROYO
A Study in National Security Administration
By
ADONIS RIZON BAJAO
A Dissertation in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
National College of Public Administration and Governance
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
2009
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A. The Situation
The nation is beset with challenges that threaten its very existence. There are those that emanate from outside the periphery of the Philippine territory and others that operate within its boundaries. With these, the security of the nation is at stake so defense of the state and the protection of the citizenry are prioritized. It is a primordial principle that these hovering threats must be met with the full powers of the state because they pose detrimental setbacks to the nation’s development prospects.
Foremost among these threats are the communist and Muslim insurgencies and their variants. They are also creations of the same political, ideological, economic and social environments that shape the nation’s well being. As such, in order to subdue these threats, the government implements various national security policies that are aimed to control the environment that breeds the root causes of dissent.
Of particular concern are the counterinsurgency operational plans that directly confront armed insurgents. The government’s reason for the use of force is to eradicate the insurgents’ menacing threat so its leadership will be brought to the negotiating table. In order to ascertain the impact of all these arrangements to the nation’s peace and stability, the nature and elements of insurgency will be weighed against counterinsurgency’s elements and essentials in the following discussions.
B. Role of National Security in National Development
National security is an important requirement of national development initiatives.1 No progress can ever gain foothold in a nation that is continually unstable and uncontrollable. 2 In this context, the government’s role is to promote lasting security and to usher in a favorable environment for the creation and equitable distribution of value and wealth.3 This condition provides the foundation for the nation’s continued existence.
Although the definition of national security is constantly evolving, the current and prevailing concept of the subject refers to “comprehensive security,” which means that it is multi-dimensional in its current form to include economic, political and even environmental dimensions.This existing conception of national security aims to promote fundamental elements of progress, first and foremost of which, is socio-political stability, which pertains to the attainment of peace and harmony among the Filipino people regardless of differing creed, ethnic origin, political affiliation or social status.
The relationship between national security administration and national development has long been recognized by the government.7 In fact, such relationship has also been established by numerous theories and studies that advocate the necessity of defense economy and political economy, or military build-up and intervention in generating opportunities for economic development.
Likewise, reputable local and international institutions and leading authorities like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development emphasized the necessity of security to development, the same way that the United Nations recognized that security and development reinforce each other.
Indeed, the role of national security administration is closely linked with national development since it creates the physical and policy environments that allow the creation and equitable distribution of the nation’s value and wealth.
1. Pressing National Security Concerns
There are three (3) main national security concerns that must be attended to in order to protect the nation’s well being: domestic, intermediate and peripheral issues (National Security Council, 2001).
a. Domestic Concerns
First, the domestic concerns are: internal security threats, intrusions in the Kalayaan Group of Islands and territorial waters, illegal exploitation of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and external aggression. These issues are to a great extent brought about by human actors and directly affect the core of national security. The threat of insurgency tops the list and entails immediate government attention (National Security Review, 2008).
b. Intermediate Concerns
Second, intermediate concerns include financial crisis, economic disparities, calamities, disasters and organized crimes. These are issues that are affected not only by internal forces, but also by external actors and natural occurrences. Coordinated action and support from other regional counterparts are indispensable to the government for it to be able to responsively address these concerns (National Security Review, 2008).
c. Peripheral Concerns
Third, peripheral concerns cover transnational crimes, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, regional security, and other possible flash points in the global environment. These problems are beyond the internal capacities of the state to solve. Hence, a more comprehensive global security framework is needed to confront issues of this magnitude (National Security Review, 2008).
The illustration in the next page depicts the various security concerns of the country and their proximity to the core of national security.
(Source: National Security Council, 2008)
Figure 1 – National Security Concerns
Among all national security concerns, the domestic insurgency situation poses the biggest threat to the nation’s peace and harmony. For more than four decades, internal security threats have been considered as the gravest challenge to social peace and political stability. These threats have continually mired the nation’s progress due to the internal divisions and conflict which they have generated among the people. As earlier stated, the social and political instabilities brought about by the classes between the government and insurgent forces have shunned prospects for economic growth and development as investors turned away from the Philippines due to the risks involved in bringing money into our economy.
C. The Nature of Insurgency
To have a closer look at the insurgency situation of the country, the nature, definitions and ideological orientations of the insurgent forces are first scrutinized.
Insurgency is a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and is not recognized as belligerency under international law. An insurgent force seeks to achieve a political objective by military means.In the local setting, insurgency is considered as an internal political revolt, which the national government does not recognize as an organized revolution. On the same note, other states do not consider the insurgent groups as belligerents or give them due recognition as having the same rights as the Republic of the Philippines.
As an armed struggle, insurgency might develop into what is known as “rebellion” when directed towards territorial separation or “revolution” when aimed at the overthrow of the government.
In this study, insurgency is used to describe a form of armed warfare against the government, wherein the rebels have the support or acquiescence of a part of the populace; and the means used by the insurgents to achieve their aim of overthrowing the government include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, or terrorism.
In the Philippines setting, different insurgent groups have evolved with various ideological anchors. Their demands are as diverse as their political and religious orientations. At present, there are two main variants of insurgents in the country: the communist insurgents and the Muslim secessionists.
Communist insurgency by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), which resurged in the 1960’s, aims to supplant the democratic system of government with communist rule. On the other hand, Muslim secessionism, which saw prominence in the 70’s, are divided into three different aggrupations: the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which supports autonomy in southern Philippines; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which calls for the establishment of an independent Islamic State in Mindanao; and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) that move in the guise of “Jihad” alongside an international terror network to sow chaos in the country through acts of terrorism and kidnapping.
D. Elements of Insurgency
In further detailing these different variants and groupings, the insurgent groups or internal security threat groups are categorized according to three (3) elements that distinctively separate one from the other: principles, objectives, and means.
Figure 2 – Elements of Insurgency
1. The Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples’ Army/
National Democratic Front (CPP/ NPA/NDF)
The counterrevolutionary revisionist line of the Lava brothers (Jesus, Jose, and Francisco) and Luis Taruc which persisted for three (3) decades within the merged Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas and the Socialist Party of the Philippines was internally criticized and repudiated. Consequently, the CPP issued a “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party” document and promulgated the “Programme for a People’s Democratic Revolution.” Under its leadership, the people’s guerrillas were transformed into the New People’s Army (NPA) on March 29, 1969. In a meeting of Red commanders and fighters, the Taruc-Sumulong “gangster clique” was likewise repudiated as a counterrevolutionary remnant of the Lava’s and Taruc’s. A document of rectification was similarly issued and the “Rules of the New People’s Army” was promulgated.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 3 – LCM Trends
The CPP/NPA/NDF envisions seizing political power by encircling the cities from the countryside with the ultimate objective of overthrowing and replacing the existing government. It employs armed struggle in the rural areas and open mass movement in urban centers to attain its avowed goal. In its pursuit of this revolutionary target, the CPP/NPA/NDF exploits the freedom and protection bestowed by our country’s democratic institutions and way of life.
Subsequently, the Local Communist Movement (LCM) has split into two (2) main groups: the “Reaffirmist” or mainstream Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front (NDF) and the “Rejectionist” factions. These two factions share the common objective of seizing political power from the national government to eventually supplant the country’s democratic form of government with communist rule.
Meanwhile, the CPP/NPA/NDF continues the conduct of political, economic, social and psychological actions to drive a wedge between the government and the people. The Party also infiltrates legitimate organizations and undertakes united front-building with the labor, student/youth, and urban poor sectors, which the Party then agitates to participate in CPP-initiated rallies, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest actions. At the same time, its military arm, the NPA, conducts raids, ambuscades and harassments as part of its guerrilla operations to bleed and weaken the government security forces and eventually destroy the same.
To date, the CPP/NPA/NDF continues to be the number one threat to internal security. It has retained its politico-military capability and maintained nationwide influence to be able to intensify its recruitment activities for the conduct of mass actions in urban areas and armed struggle in the countryside.
However, despite its capabilities, the CPP/NPA/NDF is vulnerable to a concentrated government effort aimed at decisively defeating its main armed component, dismantling its politico-military infrastructures, reestablishing government control and authority in contested areas, and reducing the root causes of insurgency through good governance.
2. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Another entity is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the southern Philippines. As early as the 1960s, Muslim nationalists appropriated the term Moro and transformed it into a positive identity for a set of people who “resisted colonial subjugation” and maintained their Islamic religion but who have been forcibly annexed into the colonial territory and consequently marginalized under the Philippine State.
The MNLF consisted of three (3) factions, following three (3) major tribal lines: the Maranaos under Abdul Alonto, Maguindanaos under Hashim Salamat, and the Tausog/Samal/Yakans under Nur Misuari.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 4 – MNLF Trends
The MNLF is a separatist rebel group that emerged in the early 70s in the pursuit of a Muslim nation carved out of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. It sought to create a separate and independent Moro nation through its armed component, the Bangsamoro Army (BMA).17 In its fight for an independent Moro nation, the MNLF received support from Muslim backers from Libya and Malaysia.
After an upsurge of conflict between the government and MILF forces spurred by increasing competition for land and political influence, a process of integration was initiated by the government through the “Tripoli Agreement” in 1976 which created separate regional governments in Region IX and XII, brokered by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Subsequently, the rebel group signed a peace accord with the Philippine Government (GRP) on September 16, 1992. The MNLF still moves for genuine autonomy but maintains its support for the peace process as enunciated in the Tripoli Agreement. Nowadays, it carries out its advocacies through parliamentary struggle under the democratic system of government.
Meanwhile, the MNLF Breakaway Group, a breakaway faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was formed when the main insurgent force joined the political mainstream after the 1992 peace accord was entered into. Though struggling in number and resources, it poses a significant threat in Sulu province. The members of this group tried to revive the dissidence movement but were again subdued following a failed attempt to free their detained leader, Nur Misuari, in the thick of the Mindanao conflict in 2001.
3. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a splinter group of the MNLF which was formed during the time when the latter was greatly weakened with the establishment of Philippine diplomatic relations with Islamic countries believed to be supporting the MNLF.18 It was formed by Hashim Salamat and other disgruntled Central Committee members who bolted from the mainstream MNLF in 1978.
The MILF does not support MNLF’s aim for autonomy and the latter’s accession to the Tripoli Agreement. Instead, the MNLF endeavors to establish a separate Islamic Republic through armed struggle.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 5 – MILF Trends
The MILF also engages the government in protracted peace negotiations but at the same time continues to build-up its manpower and logistics. Additionally, it exploits the peace process to elicit international sympathy and recognition to pursue its goal of carving out an independent state for Mindanao. Although the MILF threat is concentrated in Central Mindanao, it remains to be a major internal security concern because of its fairly huge mass support and continued assistance from foreign Islamic organizations and personalities.
4. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Other aggrupations of Muslim insurgent groups are the Abu Sayyaf Group that surfaced in 1993 and the Jemaah Islamiya that was formed in 2003. They have forged alliances with international Al Qaeda terrorist cells and other regional terrorist groups for an alleged Muslim cause.20 These groups, however, espouse no principle at all. Moreover, they apply terrorism and kidnapping as means to advance their agenda.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 6 – ASG Trends
Lately, the group has been pre-occupied with recruitment and kidnap-for-ransom activities to generate funds for the procurement of high-powered weapons. The ASG is still considered as the immediate threat group in Southwestern Mindanao. Although most of their splintered units are on the run to avoid confrontation with government forces, its special operations group - lurking in several urban centers - can conduct terrorist activities that include bombings of uncooperative business establishments. Despite numerous setbacks incurred in the past, the ASG continues to project an image of strength and sow terror in the local communities.
Moreover, while many Southern Philippine communities are against the terrorist means which the ASG uses to attain its goals, the ASG continues to enjoy some degree of support from a portion of the population in the south.
5. The Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic terrorist group which was founded in Malaysia and is composed mostly of Indonesians. It adopts an anti-West agenda and espouses “Jihad Fisabilillah.” It aims to depose secular governments and establish an Islamic Republic unifying Southeast Asian states. Its principal strength lies on its networking capability and the lethality of its actions. It has the capability to destroy critical infrastructures resulting in mass casualties, economic losses and major disruption in peoples’ daily lives.
The Jemaah Islamiya began to make waves in the Philippines in 2003 with a total number of 40 members. In 2004, its number was reduced to 33.
The graph in the next page illustrates the JI’s dwindling strength.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 7 – JI Trends
6. Over-all Internal Security Threats Trends
Despite differing orientations, the communists insurgents and MILF forces have been considered as priority concerns that require immediate action since the political objective of both the CPP and MILF is the violent overthrow of the central government of Manila: “not until the counter-revolutionary armed forces, including foreign oppressor troops, puppet troops and all kinds of murder gangs have been destroyed can the independent regime in the countryside or the people’s democratic state system throughout the country be established.”21 Political power to these groups grows out of the barrel of a gun.
The means that these internal security threat groups employ is armed struggle through protracted war: “the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of the revolution.”22 In response to this, the government must craft a strong policy to deal a potent intervention to the insurgency situation. Although the collective strength of all variants has since dropped after reaching its peak in 1987, the fluctuating trend being reflected in government reports is still a good cause for alarm.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 8 – Over-all Armed Insurgency Trends
E. Administration of National Security through Counterinsurgency
Since no country has ever benefited from protracted war, insurgent threats to internal security will never be tolerated by any sovereign state. For this reason, the Philippine Government crafts policies and takes action in accordance with those policies to solve the long-standing insurgency problem.
Counterinsurgency policies are expressed in Internal Security Operations Plans (ISOPs). These were formulated to confront the distinct nature and elements of communist and Muslim insurgencies. A thorough understanding of the nature and elements of insurgency is an indispensable requirement for better counterinsurgency policy formulation and analysis.23 Moreover, these ISO plans are primarily formulated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to address the armed components of various insurgent entities.
With the aforesaid requisites, counterinsurgency policies are crafted espousing a holistic response that corresponds to national security requirements consisting of political-legal, ideological-informational, economic-social, and security-military offensives to address the root causes of insurgency such as maldistribution of the fruits of the land and national wealth, and plutocracy (government of, by, and for the few).24 This holistic response has been applied by different administrations from the Martial Law period up to the Post EDSA Revolution years .
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 9 – AFP ISO Plans
1. The AFP’s Internal Security Operation Plans-in-Review
The counterinsurgency policies, as documented in the Internal Security Operations Plans, aim to achieve the national policy of the Philippine Government. For decades after the resurgence of insurgent threat groups, these blueprints guide the actions of the counterinsurgent forces to subdue the armed threats (AFP Primer, 2004).
a. Oplan ‘Katatagan’
As early as the 1970’s, Operation Plan “Katatagan” was the centerpiece of the Marcos administration during the Martial Law era. It was still continued shortly even after EDSA 1 in 1986, making it the definitive military blueprint in eradicating the problem of insurgency. Oplan “Katatagan” was implemented using the left-hand and right-hand efforts to represent the security operations and the nation-building tasks of the military. The plan, although the first one to be comprehensively written to address armed insurgency, posted a very dismal performance that led to the steep increase in insurgent strength, peaking to a height of 48,400 members in 1987.
b. Oplan ‘Mamamayan’
Following the failure of the Martial rule and the re-democratization of the Philippines after the EDSA Revolution, Oplan “Mamamayan” was crafted to replace the state-oriented counterinsurgency policy with a people-oriented one, as its title denote. This Plan served as a transitional policy from Oplan “Katatagan” to a newer strategy crafted later on, called Oplan “Lambat Bitag.” However, the insurgent trend was still at its height even with the installation of the new administration under President Aquino.
c. Oplan ‘Lambat-Bitag’
It was only during the implementation of Oplan “Lambat Bitag” from 1988 up to 1996 that a significant decline in the insurgents’ number was noted. The strategic shift reflected in the implementation of “Lambat Bitag” outlined the heavy focus on civil-military operations and the inclusion of Government Agencies (GAs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in the military strategy. The holistic approach proved to work very effectively in a more democratic environment as it pulled the insurgent strength to its lowest level in the 1990’s.
d. Intervening Oplans
After Oplan “Lambat-Bitag," intervening operation plans were subsequently crafted, such as Oplan “Unlad Bayan (1994-1996), Oplan “Pagkalinga” (1996-1997), Oplan “Kaisaganaan” (1997-1998), Oplan “Makabayan” (1998-1999) and Oplan “Balangai” (1999-2001). These plans, though short-lived, built upon the gains of Oplan “Lambat-Bitag” by infusing developmental programs into cleared areas. However, inherent economic obstacles and the lack of capital and other opportunities for development resulted in the AFP’s poor performance in implementing all of these succeeding policies.
Likewise, the focus of these operational plans on the developmental aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign had consequently pulled the attention away from traditional military operations against the insurgents’ armed components. Furthermore, ISO was shortly relegated to the police force in the early 90’s, thereby causing a major setback in the over-all counterinsurgency campaign. Because of this debacle in internal security operations, the responsibility was returned back to the AFP’s jurisdiction immediately thereafter (AFP ISO Plan, 2004).
Hence, it was established that integration of efforts of all security stakeholders was a viable response to the insurgency threats. This approach was instituted in response to the need for a comprehensive restructuring of the AFP’s ISO strategy. Contrary to the Martial Law era’s heavy focus on military operations, the re-democratization process changed the military’s operational outlook and orientation. Such approach was contained in Oplan “Lambat Bitag” and in succeeding intervening oplans.
e. Oplan ‘Bantay-Laya’
With the resurgence of insurgent threats in 2001, the government came up with Oplan “Bantay-Laya” based on Executive Order No. 21, otherwise known as the “National Internal Security Plan” (National Internal Security Plan, 2001).
There are many provisions that differentiate “Bantay-Laya” from other plans. But, nonetheless, it still closely resembles the “Lambat-Bitag” format, save for those provisions addressing the growing number of threat groups that challenge counterinsurgency and counterterrorism at the same time. “Bantay-Laya” includes threat groups like those of the Communist and Muslim insurgents (Moro Islamic Liberation Front/Moro National Liberation Front/MNLF Breakaway Group) and terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiya. The Oplan is also time-bound, with a set deadline within which to end insurgency and terrorism. “Bantay Laya” also adjusted its methodology to Clear-Hold-Support (CHS) phases, instead of the previous Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (CHCD) phases adopted in other plans. This change provided for support and close coordination with other government agencies in the implementation of development programs without requiring the armed forces to carry out development projects directly so the military can concentrate on its primary missions.
F. Elements of Counterinsurgency
With the Internal Security Operations Plans adopted by the government through the years, it is also of outmost significance to detail the elements of counterinsurgency that directly bear the brunt in meeting the enemy forces head on. Because insurgency is the oldest form of warfare on the planet, national governments the world over have learned through the passing of time to face squarely the forces of insurgency and secessionism. This natural response is seen particularly in our country considering that communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists have continuously undermined political stability and decimated national resources for the past forty three (43) years.
In our case, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is the main element that implements the government’s counterinsurgency policy. It plays a significant role in the cooperative effort for the establishment of a peaceful environment conducive to development by paving the way for reforms and supporting government institutions for the nation’s stability and prosperity at present as well as in the future. (National Internal Security Plan, 2007).
As part of the bureaucracy, the AFP contributes in the achievement of national security objectives and sustainable human development goals.
1. The Armed Forces of the Philippines
a. Constitutional Mandate
It is enshrined in the Constitution that the Armed Forces of the Philippines is “the protector of the people and the State.” This noble duty gives the AFP full authority to bear arms and carry the defense of the country through the use of force, or the threat of its use (Section 3, 1987 Philippine Constitution). In order to better understand the AFP, a situationaire lays down its mission, objectives, capabilities, structure, strength and disposition.
b. Mission and Types of Operations
Being fully anchored on the fundamental laws of the land, the AFP’s mission is “to protect the people and serve the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory.” This is the very essence of military service and the AFP’s reason for being. Such mission also outlines the armed forces’ importance in safeguarding the nation.
Likewise, in dispensing its security mission, the armed forces perform various types of operations including sustained marginalization of different threat groups in internal security operations; protection of vital installations; prevention of terrorist attacks; and support of international peacekeeping operations. More often, it is necessary for the AFP to operate beyond its national limits in order to constructively engage regional and global counterparts in areas of mutual benefit. This is done with an aim of building stronger security arrangements with other nations (National Military Strategy, 2001).
c. National Military and Operational Objectives
The national military objectives serve as broad and lofty ideals for the armed forces to accomplish its missions. Among these objectives are to decisively defeat all armed internal security threats, maintain territorial integrity and defend national territory, protect the Exclusive Economic Zone, contribute to regional peace and stability, and support and assist lead government agencies in the counterinsurgency campaign.
In turn, the AFP sets objectives to accomplish national security policies. Its specific operational objectives include the attrition of the Local Communist Movement’s armed groups and the destruction of their political infrastructure, as well as the neutralization of the Southern Philippines’ Secessionist Groups’ (SPSGs) or the Muslim Secessionist Groups’ military capability in the event that the peace process fails. Beyond internal security operations, the AFP is also responsible in deterring other countries from further encroaching in the Kalayaan Group of Islands, defending the Reed Bank against foreign intrusion, conducting sustained maritime surveillance around the Philippine territories and conducting search and rescue operations during calamities and disasters (National Security Review, 2008).
d. Capabilities and Characteristics
In more general terms, the AFP is capable of conducting internal security operations, territorial defense, special operations, information operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions, international peace support operations, rapid deployment missions, and other support missions. Additional capabilities include the facilitation of veterans’ affairs and maintenance of military shrines, pursuit of capability building initiatives, and mobilization of resources (AFP Annual Accomplishment Report).
With the various types of missions it conducts, the AFP works on being multi-mission capable, interoperable, joint, and sustainable. These qualities are needed to carry the armed forces through numerous challenges that confront the military as a national governmental force (National Military Strategy, 2001).
e. Structure and Strength
(Source: AFP, 2008)
Figure 10 – AFP Organizational Structure
The disposal of these varied missions necessitates an organization that has a three-tiered security coverage for land, sea and air. The armed forces must be geographically spread all over the archipelago for immediate response to any exigency. As such, the AFP is structured with forces for land, naval and air warfare. These are represented by the different components from the Philippine Army, Navy and the Air Force.
In turn, these major services provide the forces for the Unified Commands in Luzon [National Capital Region Command (NCRCOM), Northern Luzon Command
MAJOR SERVICESARMYAIR FORCENAVYAFPAFP-WIDE SUPPORT & SEPARATE UNITSGHQ & HSCPSGPMAAFPJCSCAFPRESCOMISAFPAFPMCAFPCESCEISSAFPCRSAFPAFPLOGCOMAFPFCAFPDSCWESCOMUNIFIED COMMANDSCENTCOMSOLCOMNOLCOMNCRCOMEASTMINCOMWESTMINCOMAFPNDSC(NOLCOM) and Southern Luzon Command (SOUTHCOM)], in Visayas [Central Command (CENTCOM)], and in Mindanao [Western Command (WESCOM), Eastern Mindanao Command (EASTMINCOM) and Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM)]. These commands are in-charge of the counterinsurgency campaigns in their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).
Different AFP-Wide Service Support Units (AFPWSSUs) are also formed to provide needed support for operating troops. The AFPWSSUs include personnel (General Headquarters and Headquarters Support Command), V.I.P. security (Presidential Security Group), cadets’/officers’ training (Philippine Military Academy and AFP Command and General Staff College), reservists training (AFP Reserve Command), intelligence/security (Intelligence Service, AFP), medical services (AFP Medical Center), trading (AFP Commissary Exchange Services), technology (Communications, Electronics, Information System Services, AFP), civilian relations (Civil Relations Services, AFP), logistics (AFP Logistics Center), finance (AFP Finance Center), dental services (AFP Dental Services Corps), and the newly-created National Development Support Command (NDSC), among others.
f. Disposition and Location
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 11 – Disposition and Location
The armed forces posted a total number of 115,000 personnel, with the Army
having the biggest population of 65,000 soldiers, followed by the Navy with 35,000,
and the Air Force with 15,000. They are distributed in the various headquarters and in
different Unified Commands all over the archipelago.
use force, it is just a small part of the whole national security equation. There are
other equally important instruments of national power such as political, informational
and economic forces. The armed forces only exercise its role under the security
element of this framework. There are many levels that separate the AFP’s
counterinsurgency mission and the different tasks given to the organization as these
are passed down the ladder in the military chain of command.
2. Levels of War (Philippine Scenario)
The various levels of warfare in the Philippine setting include the strategic, operational and the tactical levels of operations.
(Source: GHQ, AFP, 2008)
Figure 12 –Levels of War (Philippine Scenario)
a. Strategic Level
The strategic level of war is the level wherein a nation, often in alliance or coalition with other nations, determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance. At this level, the nation develops and uses national resources, and does what is necessary to accomplish its objectives. This is not solely amilitary function as it relates to the policy making capacity of the country’s political actors as well. Their policies consequently direct the armed forces’ strategic projection to further national defense objectives (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook).
In administrative matters, the drafting of national strategy for internal security operations takes place at the strategic level. National security strategy refers to the nation’s long range plans and policies using all resources to achieve its peacetime or wartime goals. To “defeat all threats” is the national policy that expresses the Commander-in-Chief’s intent. The National Internal Security Plan (NISP) expresses this as an objective against internal security threats (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook, 2004).
In addition, military strategy refers to the use of the armed forces in the furtherance of national security policy. It is expressed as the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the Department of National Defense (DND). The strategic level is where the Secretary of National Defense, as an extension of the President’s administrative power, oversees the entire AFP operations and represents its various concerns to political leaders.
b. Operational Level
This is the level where military forces are employed to achieve strategic goals through design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Actions at this level aim to give meaning to tactical actions in the context of some larger design that is framed by military strategy (AFP “Bantay Laya” Handbook, 2004).
The General Headquarters (GHQ) of the AFP executes military strategic direction in the form of the AFP Internal Security Operations Plan (AFP ISOP). It directly tasks the Unified Commands (UCs) under its control to perform campaigns in different areas of the country. The UCs then craft their respective campaign strategies that represent plans of action to achieve specific and assigned tasks. As the orchestrator of campaigns, these commands direct the forces from the three major services of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, as they operate in a joint environment utilizing land, naval and air assets.
c. Tactical Level
The tactical level serves as the cutting edge in the conduct of ISO. It refers to the detailed defeat and destruction of enemy forces and the thwarting of their intentions in battlefield operations. These types of operations range from the conduct of major engagements by the divisions down to the smallest skirmishes engaged in by 7-men squads. In these varying hierarchies, the chain of command is strictly adhered to. Each military subdivision is assigned specific areas of responsibility and the elimination of armed insurgents in these areas is the expected result of military actions.
3. Types and Forms of War
Knowing the main element and the various levels of war in counterinsurgency theory, it is truly necessary to distinguished between the types and forms of war being addressed by the AFP. This distinction must be established in order to advocate lasting initiatives than mere strategy of reactions, establish complete understanding of insurgent activities rather than espouse a strategy of trial and error, and institutionalize fundamental solutions rather than transitory techniques against insurgency. With regard to internal security operations, the AFP conducts counter-guerrilla operations, which is a form of warfare.
Osanka (1961) defined war as a violent interaction between two organized political groups (governments or otherwise).26 The types of war are types of interaction. They may be defined in terms of the nature of the participants, the nature of their goals, the efforts they make to achieve those goals, and, broadly speaking, the resources they employ. Four types of war are peculiarly relevant to world politics today.
a. Total War
First, total war is a struggle between governments in which at least one aims for the destruction of the other and uses all the means at its disposal to achieve that aim.Under present conditions, total war between major powers would involve the use of thermonuclear weapons.
b. General War
Second, general war is a struggle between governments in which at least one aims for the complete destruction of the other but does not use all the means at its disposal. Under present conditions, general war between major powers would not involve the extensive use of thermonuclear weapons. World War II was a total war; if it occurs again, it would be a general war.
c. Limited War
Third, limited war is a struggle between major or minor powers in which each has a restricted goal and in which each employs only a portion of its resources, usually within a defined geographical area. The Korean War was a limited war between the United States and Communist China.
d. Revolutionary War
Fourth, revolutionary war is the struggle between a non-governmental group and a government in which the former attempts to destroy the latter by all the means at its command to replace the government in some or all of its territory. The post-World War II struggles in Indochina, Malaya, and Algeria were revolutionary wars.
The boundary lines between these types of war are not necessarily precise. In theory, however, the four types are mutually exclusive. Each type encompasses the sum total of the military interactions between the participants.
A form of warfare, on the other hand, is one variety of military activity involving particular military forces, weapons, and tactics. It need not encompass the complete pattern of military interaction between the opposing parties. A naval blockade, a “conventional” ground forces campaign, and strategic air bombardments are forms of warfare carried out by specialized types of military forces.
e. Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrilla warfare is thus a form of warfare and not the type of war by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places. It can only be understood in terms of a general theory of armed conflict.
Hence, a calibration of the state’s counterinsurgency responses is also a feature that will be established all throughout in this study.
The state’s propensity to apply conventional and modern warfare methods against the enemy forces’ guerrilla tactics will be reflected in a discourse on the government’s policy implementation from Marcos to Arroyo administrations. In applying the forms of warfare in counterinsurgency, there are essential requirements that must be met by the policy so that all applicable strategies may be employed for a more favorable outcome.
G. Essentials for Counterinsurgency Operations
Any counterinsurgency campaign, as comprised of organized military activities designed to combat insurgency,must have the consensus of all parties concerned with regard to the political and military aims promoted and such should be clearly stated in the ISO Plan. As the military aim is dependent on political considerations, it is essential that the political directive should clearly state three points: first, the purpose and scope of military operations; second, the short-term political and military aims governing the campaign, and third, the long-term political aim which is to be achieved when the military campaign is over.
The military aim should be to defeat or to neutralize the insurgents as soon as possible, so that lawful government can be restored and a political settlement can be reached, based on the goodwill and the free wishes of the populace. Speed is an essential part of this aim, so that the insurgency can be limited or quelled before it can develop into a threat to regional and even global peace. This calls for strategic mobility in order to achieve effective intervention without delay; one battalion quickly on the scene may well prevent a protracted and costly campaign by many brigades.
Other more specific essential requirements are: (a) combat operations, (b) civil-military understanding, (c) intelligence operations,35 (d) joint command and control structure, (e) mobility, (f) training,36 (g) public safety operations, (h) development programs,37 (i) logistical support operations, (j) population and resources control, (k) human or civil assistance,38 and (l) intelligence and strategic communication.
These essential requirements are derived from various counterinsurgency models that attempt to add on to the body of counterinsurgency theory. In practice, however, the AFP ISO Plans list strategic principles and precepts, and essential approaches and methodologies to be applied by the military to finally put an end to the menace that has gripped the nation for years.
It is enlightening to first provide the basic definition of these strategies as they were first implemented during the Marcos administration and carried over to the more recent strategic concepts adaptations during the Arroyo administration.
1. Strategic Principles
These essential strategic principles are the strategy of “Holistic Approach,” strategy of “Win-Hold-Win,” strategy of “Sustained Operations” and the strategic precepts of “Lambat Bitag” that still serve as effective basis for succeeding operational plans. In addition, the essential operational guidelines include the “Clear-Hold-Consolidate and Development” (CHCD) methodology, the Special Operations Team (SOT), and the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS).
a. Strategy of Holistic Approach
This national strategy combines all the instruments of national power like the political/diplomatic/legal, informational, economic, and psycho-social security components in order to confront and defeat the various threats posed by insurgent parties and their armed components. This strategy can only be effective if the delivery of services among the different government agencies involved is synchronized. Counterinsurgency cannot be performed by the AFP nor by the PNP single handedly, as they only assume the primary responsibility under the security component of the campaign. The establishment of an overarching control mechanism at the National Security Council (NSC) is most suitable to orchestrate this strategy. In a way, all agencies involved in the campaign can maximize their resources in order to address the root causes of insurgency. Although this strategy was already used during the Marcos administration, the dual role of the military then in security and nation building had overshadowed the participation of civilian agencies in the whole process. Later operational developments revealed the expansion of the involvement of other government agencies such that the holistic response took on an evolving meaning.
b. Strategy of Win-Hold-Win
This strategy is performed by taking a pro-active posture wherein the AFP simultaneously addresses different threat groups. In such instance, the AFP, through the Unified Commands, first focuses its combat power to win against an identified principal threat group, while at the same time, uses the economy of force to hold less priority threats. After winning priority target areas, it will refocus its forces to win previously held secondary priority threats. Should the priorities change due to the fluidity of the battle space, the AFP will also shift its focus and win against emerging threats. This strategy is done while taking into account some risks that may evolve in less priority threats. Furthermore, the prioritization of the focus of combat power is solely the prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief. As the head of state, the President directs the AFP’s attention against the most urgent internal security concern.
c. Strategy of Sustained Operations
This strategy refers to the continuing conduct of campaigns against selected threat groups until these are decisively defeated. Obviously, sustaining massive campaigns entails huge resources to back up the operators. The AFP’s campaigns are always dependent on the level of resources allotted for its operations by the national government. Suffice it to say that the level of security the AFP can provide has a direct correlation with the level of resources appropriated for it in performing its mandate. This strategy involves the participation of political actors who determine the budget for the Armed Forces (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook, 2004).
d. Strategic Precepts of ‘Lambat-Bitag’
These are the validated “Lambat Bitag” strategies that were carried over in succeeding oplans. These include rapid conclusion, gradual constriction, one-on-one, and keyhole approaches. Rapid conclusion refers to the most expedient resolution of an internal conflict. Gradual constriction is slowly defeating insurgent armed components by encircling them from outside their area of influence and then moving towards their main guerrilla base. Conversely, the keyhole approach is the reverse of gradual constriction as it creates an opening from inside the main guerrilla base and thereafter the military force moves outwards. One-on-one is fielding one AFP unit against one guerrilla group, usually with the AFP enjoying the numerical advantage (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook).
e. Operational Guidelines
Aside from these strategies that are orchestrated alongside the involvement of government entities, the AFP also employs operational principles such as the Clear-Hold-Support Methodology, Special Operations Team (SOT) Doctrine, and the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS).
(1) Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (CHCD)Methodology
The “Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop” methodology was replaced by the “Clear-Hold-Support” Methodology, due to the inability of the AFP to infuse development in contested areas in pursuance of the first campaign plan. Basically, the AFP does not have the resources and the expertise to let development initiatives flourish. Because of this shortcoming, such function is now relegated to local government units and other government agencies, while the AFP focuses on its primary roles in the clearing and holding phases and provides support for consolidation and development initiatives.
Nonetheless, the AFP still follows the methods earlier instituted. In the clearing stage, the AFP employs mobile forces to clear insurgency affected areas. It does so through the conduct of combat, intelligence and psychological operations. These three are distinct and separate systems that form the triad in AFP operations. Intelligence operations initially prepare the battlefield through the collection of information.
Thereafter, combat units follow with the conduct of combat operations against identified targets. The psychological operations come afterwards with the conduct of the Special Operations Team (SOT) doctrine to dismantle the insurgents’ politico-military structure. The SOT was only adopted during the Aquino administration and is also applied by the Arroyo dispensation.
The Hold phase involves the organization of an Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS) after the SOT. This refers to the utilization of territorial forces, composed usually of the natives in the barangay or the local populace in the municipality. They are formed as civilian volunteer organizations (CVOs) and Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units’ Active Auxiliary (CAFGU AA). Formerly, these were the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) during the Marcos years. Alongside the AFP, PNP and other security stakeholders, the CVOs and CAFGU AA solidify the defense system of localities once held by insurgents. Their main roles are to limit the freedom of action and movement, restrict access to resources and mass base support, and prevent the incursion and resurgence of insurgent threat groups.
The Support phase is the new innovation of the Arroyo administration derived from the consolidate and develop phases of previous oplans from the Marcos to Estrada administrations. Instead of doing the development initiatives, the AFP now consolidates all territorial defense forces in order to strengthen the capability of local governments to function responsively. This is also manifested in the extension of support by the AFP to civil governmental agencies in the implementation of their development plans and programs such as building roads and bridges, and installing vital economic establishments to promote business activity in the affected areas (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook, 2004).
(2) Special Operations Team (SOT) Doctrine
There has been a series of changes with regard to the implementation of the SOT doctrine through the years. This was non-existent in the Marcos era. It only started as a civil-military operations (CMO) tool in 1988 when “Lambat Bitag” was initially applied during Aquino’s presidency. Later, it was modified [Modified Special Operations Team (MSOT)] to respond to consequent changes after the “Lambat Bitag” series has ended. During the Arroyo administration, it has been reengineered [Reengineered Special Operations Team (RSOT)] to suit the peculiarities of “Bantay Laya.” Its improvements include the setting of clear and attainable objectives, and the institution of performance measures for success.
Basically, integration, concentration and linkaging are performed in cooperation with other government agencies, non-government organizations and peoples’ organizations (POs) for a more responsive approach in addressing the peculiar needs of affected barangays. These run parallel with the principles of good governance when RSOT was developed in 2001 shortly before “Bantay Laya” kicked off.
For the AFP’s part, “integration” means the combination of all CMO programs like the Reengineered Special Operations Team (RSOT), ACCORD, CARES, and the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS), among others. “Concentration” refers to the focused application of all these programs in an influenced barangay, while “linkaging” signifies the tapping of institutional sources that could provide additional organizational, technical and financial support.
All of these are performed with an end view of dismantling the insurgent parties’ politico-military structures, strengthening counter-organization, organizing Barangay Intelligence Nets (BINS), and facilitating delivery of basic services and projects for barangay development. This way, the logistical, resource and recruitment bases as well as the insurgent groups’ influence over the populace will be diminished, thereby isolating their armed component and forcing them towards the constriction area for a decisive engagement against AFP forces. Established Key Result Areas with corresponding performance indicators measure the success of RSOT operations after its termination. Survey questionnaires and interview schedules are instruments used to assess the effectiveness of RSOT (AFP “Bantay Laya” Supplemental Handbook, 2004).
(3) Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS)
After the clearing operations and the RSOT are implemented, the next step is the organization of ITDS wherein integration of all forces is generated for a more effective defense and security system of the locality. Here, the involvement of all sectors of society is encouraged for the insurgent threats to be isolated and defeated. As in the good governance framework, the ITDS also involves government forces [AFP, PNP, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units Active Auxiliaries (CAA), Civilian Volunteers Organization, local government units, sectoral organizations (NGOs, POs)], and the local populace as a whole. In all of the AFP’s strategies, this one reflects the shift in the way the armed forces conduct operations in an era of re-democratization. Such was not the case during the Martial Law years wherein the military took the lead role in the campaign. This defense system developed over time with the participation of more sectors of society.
Truly, a study on insurgency and counterinsurgency is of crucial importance to our times.40 This concern truly merits the attention of this dissertation more than any other security consideration because confronting armed insurgents has been every administration’s priority from the time they started in the late 60’s and early 70’s up to the first decade of the new millenium.41 The successful pursuit of the government in putting an end to insurgency will definitely redound to the peace and development of the country.
H. The Problem
The prevailing national security situation and the primacy of the government’s response against insurgency have thoroughly detailed all the components of contending parties in the opposite sides of the spectrum.
The menacing nature and diverse principles, objectives and means of different insurgent entities have all been addressed with the comprehensive formulation and administration of counterinsurgency policies. These involved the participation of concerned elements for effective coordination and the application of essential strategies for responsive action.
However, with the persistence of the insurgency problem in the Philippines, there is a need to understand how national security is being addressed, administered, managed and achieved by the Philippine government. A study on how counterinsurgency policies have been or are being implemented for the attainment of lasting social peace and political stability is instructive for the conduct of future security governance.
I. Objectives of the Study
As such, this seminal work has the following objectives:
1) To study how national security in the country is addressed and managed through the implementation of various counterinsurgency policies over time;
2) To analyze the nature, objectives, components, approaches and effects of various counterinsurgency policies from Marcos to Arroyo administrations;
3) To draw lessons and implications of national security administration and counterinsurgency policy implementation in governance and development.
J. Methodology
The study of national security administration is complex and expansive that one can dwell on varying discourses from the subject’s initial meanings, to the expansion of its coverage through time, up to its current definition and relevance.
Meanwhile, the study of insurgency is fraught with perils because of the zealotry and partisanship that surrounds the subject. However, there is no poverty of commentary on the broader social phenomena of ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution.’
And although there has been no systematic study written to analyze government policies, programs and approaches to counter insurgency and secessionism, the various studies conducted which focused mainly on limited periods of Philippine history can all be distilled and used to facilitate understanding of counterinsurgency policy implementation.
Through the descriptive comparative method, a historical analysis will clarify the premises, goals, and directions of counterinsurgency policies and programs in the Philippines during the last forty-three (43) years. Through this, the success and failure of the counterinsurgency efforts in these historical periods will be analyzed.
Specifically, the data that gave rise to insurgent activism (e.g. the context of insurgency) will be described, interpreted and compared in each historical period. Then, an examination of the programs, projects, and techniques employed by the government (administrative context) in response to concrete political and social situations will be conducted, taking note of the continuity and divergence of these occurrences. Later, lessons in counterinsurgency policy and program administration will be extracted to guide prospective recommendations on national security administration and governance.
It is inevitable that this study must hazard at definitions as the following chapters of this dissertation will show. While the selection of definitive characteristics of insurgency will face arbitrariness, this risk will be mitigated by the study’s internal consistency. The timeframe here stated is in itself an example of arbitrariness; its specific thrust is to emphasize the gravity of insurgency as an ‘emergency’ cause which must be addressed forthwith.
K. Significance of the Study
There can be little doubt that in the years ahead, insurgency will continue to pose important domestic and foreign policy challenges for the Philippine government. Aside from the regular participants in counterinsurgency, Philippine insurgents will be of great interest to a wide spectrum of audience – decision makers, government analysts, scholars, students, and journalists. All will find that the analysis of insurgency is a complex and challenging undertaking and must be approached in an organized way, starting with the macro-context of national security policy formulation and the micro-context of counterinsurgency policy implementation.
The framework of analysis offered in this dissertation is a unique blend of theories and actual experimental exposure in counterinsurgency policy formulationand implementation. Towards the end of the study, a new counterinsurgency model will be advocated to offer a fresh perspective in policy creation different from the way counterinsurgency frameworks were formulated in the past.
The end-product of this work is a treatise which will serve as a guideline for policy-makers in search of solutions to issues of peace and development.
L. Scope and Limitation of the Study The scope of this work is limited to communist insurgency and Muslim secessionism in southern Philippines and how the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as the main agency of the government mandated to implement counterinsurgency operations, confronted this problem. This study will only cover the period spanning the years from Marcos to Arroyo administrations, as the insurgency concern of contemporary times is contained within such duration.
External threat is also outside its scope for being a distant problem in contemporary situations.
The domestic concern of national security will be the main focus of the study while immediate and peripheral concerns will only be discussed in relation to the macro-context of external environment and its impact on domestic occurrences.
The study will analyze primary data from the AFP, which can never be obtained by any scholar without expressed permissions from the AFP hierarchy or without actual exposure to counterinsurgency policy formulation and implementation from 1968 to 2008. Secondary data will also be analyzed from reports, books and other reference materials that delve on the matter of counterinsurgency. Other records and implementing directives pertinent to the questions earlier raised will likewise be researched and documented in this work. Recommendations will be made based on the findings arrived at after a careful reading and evaluation of the materials to be used.
This work is by no means a military discourse but investigates the subject comprehensively in its psychological and political, as well as military aspects. Clausewitz’s (1976) emphasized realism and moderation in the treatment of internal war as opposed to the logical use of ‘absolute’ – that war after all is an act of violence to its utmost bounds – beyond all bounds of sense. Hence, a principle of moderation by his standard would be an absurdity.43 It recognizes the ‘political’ object as the motive of war and as such is the basic standard for determining the aim and effort of the military force. However, to pursue the logical extreme would disastrously lead to the means losing all relations to the ends.
So, while the data and period of the study may be limited by what are currently available, the analysis portion will encompass not only the military perspective but also the political dimension of counterinsurgency policy.
M. Contents of the Study
The dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Review of Literature and the Conceptual Framework
Chapter 3 National Security and Insurgency
Chapter 4 The ‘Hard State’ of President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Chapter 5 ‘Feast of Insurgents’ under President Corazon C. Aquino
Chapter 6 The ‘GRP Peace Panels’ of President Fidel V. Ramos
Chapter 7 ‘Military Onslaught’ of President Joseph E. Estrada
Chapter 8 The ‘MOA on Ancestral Domain’ of President Gloria M.
Arroyo
Chapter 9 Towards a Viable Strategy to Philippine Counterinsurgency
Chapter 10 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter one introduces the situation of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Philippine setting within the context of national security and development frameworks. It also identifies the problem, objectives, methodology, significance, scope and limitation of the study.
Chapter two reviews related literature, details counterinsurgency and policy implementation models and theories, and discusses relevant theses and studies on success and failure factors in counterinsurgency policy implementation. Likewise, it introduces the conceptual framework that operationalizes the vital linkage between national security situation (context) and counterinsurgency policy implementation (content). These concepts link with good security governance and development for more responsive solutions to the armed insurgency dilemma.
Chapter three highlights the national security conditions through time and the different themes adopted in reaction to the resurgence and progression of various insurgent entities’ principles, objectives and means. It also reflects the impact of various political/legal, ideological/informational, economic/social and security/military factors to insurgency’s continued existence or ultimate demise.
Chapter four focuses on the ‘Jabiddah’ counterinsurgency project, the Martial Law administration versus communist insurgents, Presidential Decree 1618 or the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, and the diplomatic offensives of Ferdinand Marcos to cut the base of support of communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists.
Chapter five clarifies the ‘’re-democratization’’ counterinsurgency approach of Corazon Aquino in terms of mass-based support, amnesty to insurgents, release of political prisoners, military reformation, and transparency.
Chapter six evaluates the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement in 1996 of Fidel Ramos which made Nur Misuari the third Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), RA 9054 which expanded the organic act, the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law and the AFP modernization program.
Chapter seven examines the military strategy of Joseph Estrada to recover military camps appropriated by the MILF to carve its military base within the Philippine territory.
Chapter eight explores Gloria Arroyo’s priority on counter-terror operations and the implications of the agreement on ancestral domain aborted by the Supreme Court which literally created a Bangsamoro state within the Philippines with its own military, foreign relations, finance and other de facto government powers.
Chapter nine presents the findings of the study after comparing all counterinsurgency approaches from Marcos to Arroyo administrations. This chapter also selects the best practices and approaches to serve as suitable models for future dispensations.
Chapter ten summarizes this dissertation with the inevitable correlation of the environment to insurgency’s fluctuations, and concludes with valuable lessons how national security administration, through counterinsurgency polices, can help tame such environmental conditions. In the final analysis, this section recommends feasible administrative measures to better approach insurgency in the future.
